A set of economic entities embedded in a network graph collaborate by opportunistically exchanging their resources to satisfy their dynamically generated needs. Under what conditions their collaboration leads to a sustainable economy? Which online policy can ensure a feasible resource exchange point will be a ained, and what information is needed to implement it? Furthermore, assuming there are di erent resources and the entities have diverse production capabilities, which production policy each entity should employ in order to maximize the economy's sustainability? Importantly, can we design such policies that are also incentive compatible even when there is no a priori information about the entities' needs? We introduce a dynamic production scheduling and resource exchange model to capture this fundamental problem and provide answers to the above questions. Applications range from infrastructure sharing, trade and organization management, to social networks and sharing economy services.
INTRODUCTION
Economic entities (EE), being individuals, organizations or countries, need resources (natural resources, services, etc.) in order to sustain their existence and normal activity. eir needs are expressed in terms of requests of a certain amount of a given resource (demands) that are generated at time instances and that should be satis ed either by immediate provisioning of the resource if there is in stock with the entity, or provisioning when will become available to the entity in the near future. Each economic entity has the capability of generating resources either because it is endowed (natural resources) or because of production planning and specialization. Hence each EE generates resources, certain quantities of which become available at certain instances and they either satisfy a pending resource request if there is one.
An economic entity is self sustainable if she can satisfy her own needs for resources in the long run in the sense that for each resource type the rate with which resource is produced exceeds the rate with which resource requests are generated. If resource requests are generated faster than the production rate capability of that resource then there is a shortage of the resource for the entity; this may undermine the long term sustainability of the entity. If we have a collection of EE that are capable of exchanging resources, it is possible that although some of them are not sustainable by their own, they may engage in a resource exchange scheme where an entity covers her own shortage in a resource by the excess production of another EE. When there is an exchange scheme such that all EE become sustainable then the resulting economy is sustainable.
In the rst part of this paper we consider an economy of EE speci ed by an exchange graph the topology of which indicates which EE may exchange resource with which other EE, and the rates of resource demands and production of each EE. We specify the conditions for sustainability of such an exchange economy, and we provide a dynamic exchange scheme where each EE determines how to allocate her excess resources to her neighbors such that each EE satis es her needs if the exchange economy is sustainable. Interestingly enough, no central coordination is necessary and it is adequate if each EE just observes the pending resource requests of her neighbors and allocates the excess resource to the neediest neighbor (including her own needs).
In the second part of the paper we consider the case where each EE may do some planning of her production capabilities. It is her choice to increase the production of a certain resource by committing more e ort to that purpose to the expense of reducing the production of another resource from the production of which the e ort is reallocated. e production choices of an EE are re ected to the production rates of the di erent resources by the EE. We assume that a production plan is represented by the vector of resource production rates of the di erent resources under that plan. e possible production plan choices are represented by the set of di erent production rate vectors that are feasible by the EE. It is reasonable to assume that each EE a empts to nd a plan that covers her demands, yet this might not be feasible for all entities. erefore, assuming an exchange economy among the EE we consider the question: is there a choice of production plan for each EE such that the production vectors result in a sustainable economy? We provide conditions under which that is feasible, and then we introduce a dynamic scheme for each entity determining her production plan that when operates on top of the exchange policy described earlier we result in a sustainable economy. e production planning may operate in a di erent (slower) time scale than the exchange scheme and again it is dynamic and agnostic on the global economy picture as it does not require knowledge of the EE capabilities in terms of feasible production rates. Each EE recon gures her production plan at each time in an a empt to satisfy her own needs and that of her exchange peer EE in the best possible ways based on the declared unsatis ed demands of the past. at dynamic policy has as a result global sustainability.
Finally, we extend this analysis to the important case the production induces signi cant costs. e cooperation and exchange of resources among the EEs can result in a sustainable economy and also reduce the aggregate induced costs compared to the scenario where each EE operates independently. e question that inevitably arises is under what conditions the entities will cooperate, and in particular how they will agree to split the cost-reduction bene ts emerging from their collaboration. Leveraging the Nash bargaining solution, we describe the general properties of such incentive-compatible (IC) cooperative solutions. Moreover, we develop dynamic policies that ensure the sustainable operation of the exchange economy while satisfying the IC criterion. Our solution is agnostic on the actual needs and production rates of the EEs, and ensures their fair (and hence self-enforcing) collaboration even without knowing a priori the bene ts of their synergy. e rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the dynamic exchange model employed to study these cooperative systems and present a simple distributed algorithm that stabilizes the economy whenever this is possible. Section 3 focuses on the richer model with di erent types of resources and introduces a dynamic production scheduling policy, amenable to distributed execution, that provably stabilizes the economy. In Section 4 we present a model where the di erent production plans induce di erent costs, and devise an incentive-compatible policy that ensures the system's sustainable operation. Finally, Section 5 provides a discussion about related works and concludes our study. All proofs can be found in [8] .
COMMODITY SHARING
We consider a set N of N = |N | economic entities (EE) who produce a set K of K = |K | types of resources (or, commodities) over time.
e entities are embedded in a directed connected graph G = (N , E), where the set E of edges denotes the possible exchanges which are not necessarily bidirectional. Each EE has two roles, acting both as a consumer and as a producer of resources. erefore there are i = 1, 2, . . . , N consumers and j = 1, 2, . . . , N producers in the system. We denote with N i the set of j = 1, . . . , N i producers who can serve consumer i; and with N j the set of i = 1, . . . , N j consumers who can receive resources from producer j. e connectivity among consumers and producers is determined by E. Note that (i, i) ∈ E, ∀i ∈ N , as each EE can serve her own requests. We rst study the se ing with one commodity.
We assume that resources are produced and allocated in batches, hence we consider a time slo ed operation. During each slot t, a number of A i (t ) ≥ 0 resource requests are generated at consumer i ∈ N . Let X i (t ) be the number of demands, i.e., pending requests, at the ith consumer by the end of slot t. In the beginning of each slot t, B j (t ) units of resource are generated at producer j. We de ne the vector B(t ) = (B j (t ), j ∈ N ). e processes A i , B j , i, j ∈ N , are independent and i.i.d. over time, with constant and Figure 1 : An instance of a cooperative economy with 3 entities and the respective dynamic exchange model with 3 consumers and 3 producers. Each entity can serve its own demands, and the demands of its neighbors. e graph is directed.
An example is shown in Fig. 1 . e control action in this system is to decide how the resources of the producers will be allocated to the consumers at each slot t. Let I ji (t ) ∈ {0, 1} denote whether producer j is servicing the demand of consumer i ∈ N j during slot t, by allocating to i all its available resources. e control matrix is then:
for modeling purposes, we assume that I is a N × N binary matrix, where the entry (j, i) can be equal to 1 only if (j, i) ∈ E. Without loss of generality, we assume that each consumer can be served by many producers, but each producer can serve at most one consumer or idle. Hence, the set of eligible control matrices is
Let M i (t ) denote the aggregate resource that consumer i receives in slot t:
en, the number of its pending requests evolves as
and we de ne X (t ) = (X i (t ), i ∈ N ). e economic sustainability can be de ned using the strong stability requirement for the demands [6] :
or, in other words, we ask that the M.C. X = {X (t )} t =∞ t =1 is ergodic and possesses a stationary distribution. It can be easily shown that the necessary conditions for sustainability of this economy are:
where N Q is the set of producers that can serve one or more consumers in set Q. ese conditions characterize the sustainability region Λ of the cooperative economy, i.e., the closure of set of demand generation rates a = (a i : i ∈ N ) that can be supported by the N entities if they collaborate. We refer to such a cooperative economy as sustainable.
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Sustainable demand region of the economy when the nodes do not collaborate (green area) and when the nodes do cooperate (red area). e following Lemma explains that (6) is su cient in the sense that it guarantees the existence of a random and state-independent servicing policy Π opt that allocates with a certain probability the resources of each producer to every consumer she is connected to. L 2.1. For any demand generation vector a ∈ Λ, there exists a stationary allocation policy Π opt that renders the economy sustainable. Moreover, this policy can be found in polynomial time.
e allocation probabilities can be also interpreted as time shares of service each consumer receives from her neighbors. e next question is whether there exists a dynamic exchange policy that ensures sustainability whenever that is possible. Namely, we are interested in policies that are amenable to distributed implementation and achieve this goal without any prior knowledge about the request and resource generation rates a i , b j , i, j ∈ N , nor the graph G.
e following theorem describes a policy that satis es the above requirements and ensures the sustainable operation of the economy whenever a ∈ Λ:
2. e max-weight policy [13] , that selects in each slot t the control action I (t ) ∈ I such that:
stabilizes the system if a ∈ Λ and yields average backlog:
where ϵ (a) is the distance of a from the boundary of Λ, and d in i the in-degree of EE i in G.
Due to the design assumption that a consumer can be served by more than one producer the optimal I * (t ) can be found in a distributed fashion as shown in Algorithm 1, where every producer simply allocates its resource to the connected consumer with the largest demand.
An example of two cooperating EE and the bene ts that emanate from their collaboration is depicted in Figure 2 . We observe that cooperation does not increase the maximum aggregate request rate Find i * = ar max i ∈N j X i (t ). 5 Set I ji * (t ) = 1. end 6 % Each consumer informs her neighbors for her demands: Send X i (t ) to every j ∈ N i . end of the EE yet the set of supportable rates expands signi cantly due to the exibility of re-routing the requests among the entities.
PRODUCTION SCHEDULING
We now focus on the case with K = {1, 2, . . . , K } di erent commodities. Each economic entity i generates A ik (t ) requests for commodity k during slot t, where the processes A ik , i ∈ N , k ∈ K are i.i.d. and independent, with E[A ik (t )] = a ik ≤ A max . Each EE j ∈ N has a certain set of feasible production plans P j . Under each plan p ∈ P j the EE produces B p jk (t ) = B p jk ≤ B max units of commodity k ∈ K in each slot t. Although we consider deterministic production, our results can be directly extended for stochastic production where, for example, the schedule selects only the mean values. Finally, we assume that each entity can update her production plan every time period t = nT with T >> 1. is re ects practical system constraints where production scheduling cannot follow the dynamics of request generation and resource allocation. e control policies of this economy include both the service allocation and the production planning. We de ne Z jp (nT ) ∈ {0, 1} as the decision of EE j to select plan p ∈ P j during period nT . is yields the production vector:
We denote with Z the production vector of all EEs, and de ne the set of all feasible plans:
It is assumed that each producer can satisfy only the demands of one consumer (including itself) for each commodity, but can concurrently serve more than one other consumers for di erent commodities. erefore, the set of all feasible control policies is
Under the above assumptions, the amount of resource k that consumer i receives during slot t is:
where t T = t T is the last time before slot t that the production schedule was updated. We denote M K (t ) = (M ik (t ) : i ∈ I, k ∈ K ) the I × K matrix of services in slot t which depends on the planning and allocation decisions Z and I K in that slot. e unsatis ed demands at each consumer for every commodity evolve in time as follows:
We can therefore de ne the sustainability region [6] :
where Co(·) is the convex hull operator. e following lemma holds. L 3.1. For any demand generation matrix a K ∈ Λ P K , there exists a stationary randomized control policy Π K opt that chooses Z every T slots, and I K every slot t, and stabilizes the economy.
Next, we design a dynamic policy that determines the plan and the service allocation, and stabilizes the system whenever a ∈ Λ P K . is is non-trivial since it involves decisions in di erent time-scales. Algorithm 2 describes the policy. e main idea is that in every time period, each producer nds for each of her neighboring consumers the commodity with the largest pending requests (line 5), and then uses these to select the plan that will serve be er the neediest consumers (line 6). en, in every time slot, the producers allocate their resources to the largest backlog of demands (lines [10] [11] [12] . Note that the algorithm can be executed in a distributed (but synchronous) fashion. e following theorem states its performance.
Suppose an economy has a sustainability region Λ P K and demand a K such that a K + ϵ1 ∈ Λ P K ; then under the policy in Algorithm 2 and a set value for V , the economy is sustainable and the average backlog of unsatis ed demands is bounded:
jk is the max production rate of j for commodity k.
e backlog of unsatis ed demands increases with T and K; and depends on the exchange graph as it includes the in-degree of nodes. 
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Set I k ji * (τ ) = 1. end end 13 % Each consumer updates its pending demands:
COSTLY PRODUCTION SCHEDULES
We now extend our analysis to the case of costly production plans. Clearly, when production of resources induces costs it is not ensured that demand rates within the sustainability region will be served (as in the previous section). Namely, when self-interested EEs cooperate it is expected that each one of them will a empt to satisfy her demands through this collaboration (e.g., by receiving resources from others) while at the same time minimizing her own production cost (e.g., selecting low-cost plans). It is well known that such free-riding behaviors may lead to tragedy of commons phenomena, where the cooperation bene ts diminish rapidly.
To address this issue, we introduce an additional design criterion for our cooperation policy, namely that of being incentivecompatible (IC) and hence implementable by the self-interested EEs. However, it is well-known that such game theoretic-based policies require the a priori knowledge of the demand rates and the cooperation bene ts, information which in many practical se ings is not available. We present here a production and service exchange algorithm that ensures the sustainable and incentive compatible operation of the economy, whenever that is possible, without relying on prior information about demands (or, production rates).
In detail, we assume that when an EE j ∈ N selects plan p ∈ P j , she incurs cost of c jp units for that period. erefore, when j operates independently, her optimal production policy can be found by solving the optimization problem (Opt ind j ):
where ζ jp ∈ [0, 1] is the probability to select plan p ∈ P j . We denote the min-cost planning solution ind j (a j ), where a j = (a jk : k ∈ K ).
When the entities collaborate they select their production and servicing policies in an incentive-compatible fashion that also ensures sustainability of the economy. In order to satisfy the IC requirement we leverage the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) [9] which possesses the important properties of axiomatic fairness and Pareto e ciency (see [15] for a discussion), and hence is selfenforcing in the presence of strategic entities. e solution of following optimization problem (Opt N ) describes the NBS solution when the resources and demands are known; it will serve as a benchmark for assessing the performance of our dynamic policy in the sequel:
ρ k ji is the probability that j will serve the demands of i for commodity k; and ζ jp the probability she will select plan p. We use constants ϵ 1 , ϵ 2 > 0 to avoid limiting cases. is problem admits a solution as we assume zero cooperating costs (e.g., no need for additional infrastructure). We denote with Λ P, B K the closure of set of demand rates that can be served under the NBS (solution of P S ) with bounded costs. In the case c jp parameters are constant and nite, this region coincides with Λ P K . It is easy to show (similarly to Lemma 1 and 2) that the policies stemming from (Opt N ) are necessary, su cient and optimal for the incentive-compatible and sustainable operation of the economy; and we denote H * N (a K ) the solution of (Opt N ).
Our goal is to design a dynamic policy that asymptotically approaches arbitrary close to the optimal planning and servicing solution. Algorithm 3 describes the dynamic policy. First, note that we introduce an auxiliary variable Y j (t ), for each EE j, representing the evolution of a virtual queue [10] which, when stable, ensures the following constraint:
where ind j,τ is the cost every EE j would incur in each period if she was serving only her own needs. is quantity is not known in advance, but can be computed by the entity in every period a er observing the pending and newly generated demands. is means that each EE has to run an algorithm for solving problem (Opt ind j ), e.g., using a threshold-based decision policy (see [6] for examples), and use the calculated value in Algorithm 3 where ind j,t is the respective running average. e virtual queue evolves in successive periods:
As before, each producer nds the most demanding commodity for each of her neighbors (line 5) and then selects the plan that maximize the expression (21): namely, the plan is selected so as to maximize the o ered service (last term), and minimize the cost of production (second term), while balancing the cost under cooperation with the cost the EE would incur if operating independently. Next, each EE allocates the service, in each small slot, based on the accumulated demands of her neighbors (lines 8-12), for each commodity, and informs her neighbors about the updated pending demands (lines [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . At the end of the period it updates the virtual queue (line 20) in order to ensure (asymptotically) that the cooperation cost will be bounded by the independent cost. e next theorem characterizes the algorithm's performance in terms of cost and average backlog demands.
Suppose an economy has a sustainability and IC region Λ P, B K and demand a K such that a K + ϵ1 ∈ Λ P, B K ; then under the policy in Algorithm 3 the economy is sustainable and the cooperation policy is incentive compatible, with optimality and demand backlogs bounded as follows:
G max is the maximum value of eq. (13), i.e., the product of the highest cost values c max ip of all entities. Interestingly, with Algorithm 3 the economic entities achieve a performance that is arbitrary close to the objective of Opt N , while the average number of pending demands is bounded. erefore, the EEs ensure sustainability and enforce an ϵ 0 -NBS solution, where ϵ 0 = C/V . e balance between fairness (or incentive compatibility) and backlog is tuned by selecting V . Interestingly, our policy uses the benchmark independent performance which does not have to be known in advance, but it su ces to use its running average (which eventually will converge in the expected value).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
e problem of cooperation lies at the core of our social and economic life, and has been excessively studied with a recent focus on the impact of the network graph on the bargaining power of each entity [3] or the cooperation outcome [11] . Similarly, from an engineering point of view, there is an interesting literature proposing cooperation models and analyzing their equilibriums, e.g., for decentralized sharing of wireless services [1] or infrastructure sharing [4] . Two important and particularly challenging aspects that remain to be understood are (i) the dynamics of cooperation, namely how such equilibriums can be achieved in an on-line fashion; and
. end (ii) the impact of network or graph constraints on the performance of such cooperative schemes.
Motivated by these observations, our work proposes a Lyapunovbased optimization approach for designing cooperation policies that achieve asymptotically an e cient and incentive compatible equilibrium. Importantly, this solution handles well information uncertainties as it does not presume the existence of prior information about the needs of the entities, nor the bene ts that their collaboration can achieve. e advantages of our approach come at the expense of asymptotic optimality which, moreover, in the case of costly production plans achieves a near-optimal outcome -and hence close to the bargaining equilibrium. Another important point here is the time-scale separation we considered, where we followed an analysis similar to [16] , [14] . e impact on performance can be directly seen at the respective demand bounds, and this calls for further research in order to improve that result. e problem of exchanging a single commodity in a static environment was studied in [5] , where the existence of competitive and coalitional equilibriums was proved. From a di erent perspective, the bene ts of resource pooling in servicing systems have been studied in operations research. O en the question there is how the induced cost will be split among the entities, e.g., see [2] , while more recent studies [12] argue that pooling might even reduce the overall performance under some assumptions about the dependence of the servicing costs on the total load. Unlike our approach, these important works focus on static systems with known demands and capacities. Besides, we consider the selection of production plans and multiple commodities. is is a particularly important aspect as it reveals that diversity in production is particularly bene cial for cooperative systems, an argument that is both intuitive and experimentally validated in macroscopic scale [7] .
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